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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44112 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-7845 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JOEL SCOTT THORNE,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, twenty-year-old Joel Scott Thorne pleaded guilty 
to felony injury to children.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  After receiving a letter from the 
deputy warden of one of the retained jurisdiction program facilities where Mr. Thorne 
had been placed, reporting Mr. Thorne had committed serious disciplinary offenses, the 
district court relinquished jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Thorne asserts the district court 




Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 K.A., in a CARES interview, reported she had met Mr. Thorne about eight 
months before the interview when they had both been at Intermountain Hospital.  (See 
Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.)1  K.A. stated she had told Mr. Thorne 
she was thirteen, and Mr. Thorne stated he was eighteen.  (PSI, p.3.)  K.A. stated she 
and Mr. Thorne had sexual intercourse three times in the month they met.  (PSI, p.3.) 
 K.A. also described an incident that happened about two days before the CARES 
interview.  (PSI, p.3.)  She reported Mr. Thorne rubbed her leg and buttocks while she 
was at his house in Nampa, and Mr. Thorne then engaged in manual-genital contact 
with her.  (See PSI, pp.3, 32.)  K.A. stated she and Mr. Thorne then smoked marijuana 
and later had sexual intercourse in his car.  (PSI, p.3.) 
 When the police subsequently interviewed Mr. Thorne, he reportedly admitted to 
having sexual intercourse with K.A. about twenty times.  (PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Thorne stated 
he was eighteen and K.A. was fourteen at the time of his police interview.  (PSI, p.4.) 
 The State charged Mr. Thorne by Information with injury to children, felony, Idaho 
Code § 18-1501(1).  (R., pp.22-23.)  The charge was based on the incident that 
reportedly happened about two days before K.A.’s CARES interview.  (See R., p.23.)  
Mr. Thorne entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.24.) 
 Mr. Thorne then participated in a psychosexual evaluation.  (PSI, pp.52-99; see 
Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, Ls.17-21.)  According to the psychosexual evaluation, 
Mr. Thorne “poses a moderate risk to re-offend within the next five to ten years with a 
                                            
1 All citations to the “PSI” refer to the 122-page PDF electronic version of the 
Presentence Report and its attachments. 
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future sexual offense when compared to other sexual offenders.”  (PSI, p.95.)  The 
psychosexual evaluation further stated Mr. Thorne “presented as being in the upper-end 
of the moderate risk to re-offend range, meaning if he were to resist treatment or 
supervision he should be reconsidered for classification as a high risk to re-offend.”  
(PSI, p.95.)   
 Based on the results of the psychosexual evaluation, the parties entered into a 
plea agreement where Mr. Thorne agreed to plead guilty to injury to children.  
(R., pp.29-43; Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, Ls.21-24.)  The State agreed to recommend a 
retained jurisdiction, and Mr. Thorne would be free to argue for a lesser sentence.  
(Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.1.)  The underlying sentence would be open for 
argument.  (Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.6, Ls.2-3.)  The district court accepted Mr. Thorne’s 
guilty plea.  (Tr., Aug. 27, 2015, p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.10.) 
 At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and that the district court retain 
jurisdiction.  (Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.6, Ls.3-8.)  Mr. Thorne recommended the district 
court place him on probation.  (Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.9, Ls.8-13.)  The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.57-59.)  The district court recommended Mr. Thorne’s placement in 
a traditional retained jurisdiction program or “rider” with a focus on sex offender 
treatment.  (R., p.58; Tr., Oct. 13, 2015, p.14, Ls.5-8.) 
 About four months after the district court retained jurisdiction, Brad Lutz, the 
Deputy Warden at North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI), sent a letter to the district 
court recommending the district court relinquish jurisdiction.  (PSI, pp.118-19.)  The 
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letter stated, “[g]iven that Mr. Thorne did not participate in a meaningful program while 
on this retained jurisdiction, we are sending this update letter in place of an Addendum 
to the Pre-sentence Investigation (APSI).”  (PSI, p.118.)  The letter explained 
Mr. Thorne had been placed into the NICI Sex Offender Assessment Group (SOAG) 
program, but he was initially sent to the Correction Alternative Placement Program 
(CAPP) facility to wait for a bed in the SOAG program to become available.  (PSI, 
p.118.) 
 The letter stated “Mr. Thorne has received five substantiated Disciplinary Offense 
Reports (DORs)” since his arrival at the CAPP facility.  (PSI, p.118.)  The letter listed 
three Class C DORs Mr. Thorne had received:  “Unauthorized Transfer of Property” on 
November 18, 2015; “Disobedience to Orders” approximately two weeks later; and a 
second “Disobedience to Orders” on January 31, 2016.  (PSI, p.118.)  The January 
2016 Disobedience to Orders DOR was reportedly for Mr. Thorne “cheeking” his 
medication and storing them in his cell, and Mr. Thorne “admitted to this behavior in the 
DOR hearing.”  (PSI, p.118.)  However, the C-Note Summary attached to the letter did 
not contain any C-Notes for November 18, 2015, late November or early December 
2015, or January 31, 2016.  (See PSI, pp.120-22.)   
 The letter also stated Mr. Thorne “received two Class A DORs; one for ‘Sexual 
Assault/Battery’ (12/22/15), and the second for ‘Body Fluids’ (12/23/15).”  (PSI, p.118.)  
With respect to the Sexual Assault/Battery DOR, the letter stated, “[t]he body of the 
DOR further notes that ‘Offender Thorne, in a written statement and interview, admitted 
to exposing his genitals and attempting to place them against the face and head of 
other offenders.’”  (PSI, p.119.)  However, the only C-Note for December 22, 2015 in the 
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C-Note Summary merely stated, “no horseplay per c/o holloway at 22:20.”  (PSI, p.121.)  
Further, the C-Note Summary did not contain any C-Notes for December 23, 2015.  
(See PSI, p.121.)    
 The C-Note Summary did reflect Mr. Thorne had his status changed to “SPL” on 
December 31, 2015, and that he was released to IDOC custody and moved to NICI on 
January 4, 2016.  (PSI, p.121.)  The earliest C-Note in the C-Note Summary mentioning 
“the DORs received at the CAPP facility” was from January 22, 2016.  (See PSI, p.120.) 
 Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter stated the DORs suggested “a significantly pro-
criminal attitude and belief system.  Given the serious nature of these offenses, 
including at least one of a sexual nature, it appears that Mr. Thorne is not an 
appropriate candidate for the retained jurisdiction program at this time.”  (PSI, p.119.)  
The letter recommended the district court relinquish jurisdiction and execute 
Mr. Thorne’s sentence.  (See PSI, p.119.) 
 Three days after the date of Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter, the district court, 
without conducting a rider review hearing, issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction.  
(See R., pp.62-63.)   The order stated: 
The Court, having received and fully reviewed the letter and Addendum 
Report dated February 16, 2016 from the Deputy Warden at North Idaho 
Correctional Institution detailing serious disciplinary offenses committed by 
the above named Defendant which occurred prior to placement at the 
North Idaho Correctional Institute Sex Offender Assessment Group 
program, and recommending this Court RELINQUISH JURISDICTION, 
and Good Cause Appearing,  
 
 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the jurisdiction retained by the 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2601(4) be, and is hereby, 
RELINQUISHED. 
 
(R., p.62 (emphasis in original).) 
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 Mr. Thorne filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction.  (R., pp.64-68.) 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
 
Mr. Thorne asserts the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction in his case.  An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 
(1998).  The district court’s discretion in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction is not 
limitless.  State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry.  The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Mr. Thorne submits the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction because the allegations against him were not proven and his rider was over 
before he had the chance to participate in appropriate programming.  The district court 
relinquished jurisdiction after reviewing Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter “detailing serious 
disciplinary offenses committed by [Mr. Thorne] which occurred prior to placement at 
the North Idaho Correctional Institute Sex Offender Assessment Group program.”  (See 
R., p.62.)  However, the C-Note Summary attached to the letter did not corroborate the 
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DORs reported in the letter.  (See PSI, pp.118-22.)  The C-Note Summary did not 
include C-Notes for the reported November 18, 2015, late November or early December 
2015, or January 31, 2016 Class C DORs, nor did it include C-Notes describing the 
reported December 22 or December 23, 2015 Class A DORs.  (See PSI, pp.118-22.) 
 While the letter stated Mr. Thorne had admitted to the January 31, 2016 Class C 
DOR and the December 22, 2015 Class A DOR (PSI, pp.118-19), Mr. Thorne denies 
the allegations.  Further, the letter and attached C-Note Summary did not contain any 
documentation of the hearing where Mr. Thorne reportedly admitted to the January 31, 
2016 Class C DOR, or the interview and written statement where he reportedly admitted 
to the December 22, 2015 Class A DOR.  (See PSI, pp.118-22.)   
 The district court did not conduct a rider review hearing that would have provided 
Mr. Thorne a chance to tell his side of the story.2  (See R., pp.62-63.)  Additionally, 
because Deputy Warden Lutz submitted a letter “in place of” a full APSI (see PSI, 
p.118), Mr. Thorne lost the opportunity to challenge the recommendation to relinquish 
jurisdiction through a written response to the APSI.  See also State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138, 143 (2001) (“In order to make the system work, it is important for the district 
court to have a report from the NICI on their assessment of the defendant’s conduct 
while participating in the rider program.  In the interest of fair judicial process, the district 
judge should also receive in writing any response the defendant may choose to make 
to the NICI recommendation.”)  Also, Mr. Thorne’s retained counsel did not dispute the 
                                            
2 Mr. Thorne recognizes the Idaho Supreme Court has held a participant in a rider 
program does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest that would require a 




allegations or file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to provide the district court with 
additional information after the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (See R., pp.2-5 
(register of actions).)  Thus, Mr. Thorne asserts the allegations against him were 
not proven. 
 Mr. Thorne further asserts his rider was over before he had the chance to 
participate in appropriate programming.  Deputy Warden Lutz’s letter stated the letter 
was sent in lieu of a full APSI “[g]iven that Mr. Thorne did not participate in a meaningful 
program while on this retained jurisdiction.”  (PSI, p.118.)  Although the district court 
recommended Mr. Thorne participate in sex offender treatment while on his rider 
(R., p.58), the SOAG program at NICI had limited bed space and Mr. Thorne was sent 
to the CAPP facility to wait for a bed to become available.  (PSI, p.118.)  The 
psychosexual evaluation concluded Mr. Thorne “appeared to have a lower potential to 
benefit from treatment at this time, indicating a low level of amenability.”  (PSI, p.91.)  
However, the psychosexual evaluation also observed “[t]hese concerns can be offset by 
[Mr. Thorne] participating in treatment in a structured environment, which could 
decrease the likelihood of treatment failure, supervision issues, and opportunity to utilize 
substances.”  (PSI, p.91.)  Unfortunately, Mr. Thorne’s rider was over before he had the 
chance to participate in such a structured environment or other appropriate 
programming. 
 The allegations against Mr. Thorne were not proven, and his rider was over 
before he had the chance to participate in appropriate programming.  Thus, Mr. Thorne 




For the above reasons, Mr. Thorne respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand the case for entry of an 
order placing him on probation. 
 DATED this 29th day of September, 2016. 
 
      ____________/s/_____________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of September, 2016, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
JOEL SCOTT THORNE 
INMATE #116988 
IMSI 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
  
BRADLY S FORD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 




      ___________/s/______________ 
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      Administrative Assistant 
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